In this examination of the bases of thought and language, Professor Julius Moravcsik explores recent approaches to these topics and discusses the philosophical assumptions behind theories of language. He puts forward a new theory of meaning that is also a proposal about human concepts: viewing meanings as explanatory schemata and interpreting human cognition as primarily explanation-seeking, rather than information processing. This view of cognition, Professor Moravcsik argues, need not commit itself to either dualism or materialism. He defends the Platonic assumptions of his proposal, showing them to be no less "scientific" than current fashionable alternatives. Professor Moravcsik explores new ways of philosophizing that differ from analytic philosophy and its continental alternatives, and indicates how philosophers today can construct proposals about thought and language that have both conceptual and empirical import. This book should be of interest to students and teachers of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and advanced students of cognitive science and linguistics.